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Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure
∗ 
 
While confounding factors typically jeopardize the possibility of using observational data to 
measure peer effects, field experiments over the potential for obtaining clean evidence. In 
this paper we measure the output of subjects who were asked to stuff letters into envelopes,  
with a remuneration completely independent of output. We study two treatments. In the "pair" 
treatment two subjects work at the same time in the same room. Peer effects are possible in 
this situation and imply that outputs within pairs should be similar. In the "single" treatment, 
which serves as a control, subjects work alone in a room and peer effects are ruled out by 
design. Our main results are as follows: First, we find clear and unambiguous evidence for 
the existence of peer effects in the pair treatment. The standard deviations of output are 
significantly smaller within pairs than between pairs. Second, average output in the pair 
treatment largely exceeds output in the single treatment, i.e., peer effects raise productivity. 
Third, low productivity workers are significantly more sensitive to the behavior of peers than 
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Scholars in many disciplines have long tried to estimate empirically the extent
to which individual behavior is modiﬁed by peer eﬀects. The reason why
doing this is diﬃcult, despite the apparent wealth of evidence from daily
experience, is that observational data do not allow us to easily separate the
pure eﬀect of peer behavior from the eﬀect of confounding factors. Using
data from a controlled ﬁeld experiment where randomly selected subjects
were paid independently of their work output, we show in this paper that
the productivity of a worker is systematically inﬂuenced by the productivity
of peers in the absence of confounding factors. These results provide clean
evidence for the existence of peer eﬀects on work behavior.
In order to understand the nature of our experiment, consider two indi-
viduals working at separate tasks, where one is in sight of the other. Suppose
that we observe them behaving in a similar way, which we suspect could be
generated by peer eﬀects. To be precise, we say that peer eﬀects exist if the
output of individual i increases when the output of j increases and nothing
else changes. Following Manski [1993], a ﬁrst set of confounding factors is
generated by the possibility that local attributes of the environments in which
the two individuals operate determine their behavior. If observational data
do not allow us to fully control for these local attributes, we could observe
the behavior of i and j changing simultaneously even in the absence of true
peer eﬀects simply because some unobserved local attributes have changed.
Second, it is possible that the two individuals have similar characteristics,
which would make them behave similarly even if they were not working one
in sight of the other. With respect to both of these possibilities, it could also
happen that i and j decide to work near each other because they like the
2same local attribute, which in turn aﬀects their behavior, or because they
both like to be near individuals with similar characteristics. In these cases,
the supposed eﬀect of peers would instead be the result of sorting according
to local or personal attributes.
The most recent generation of studies, which try to measure peer eﬀects
with observational data, has made several important steps towards solving
these problems.1 However, even if the setting oﬀers an almost perfect oppor-
tunity to identify peer eﬀects in many of these studies, the impossibility of
controlling for all local or personal confounding factors and for endogenous
sorting makes the identiﬁcation strategy not fully convincing. The most sig-
niﬁcant recent steps forward in this literature are oﬀered by Sacerdote [2001]
and Katz, Kling and Liebman [2001] who use data based on randomized
assignments of individuals to peer groups. However, both of these papers
are confronted with the consequences of local confounding factors. More
speciﬁcally, Sacerdote [2001] ﬁnds evidence of peer eﬀects among Dartmouth
students randomly assigned to the same dorm but cannot convincingly ex-
clude the possibility that these eﬀects might be due to local time varying
shocks. This is less of a problem in Katz, Kling and Liebman [2001], who
analyze the consequences of randomly changing the residential neighborhood
of families residing in high-poverty public housing projects and, therefore,
are not primarily interested in isolating pure peer eﬀects from local eﬀects.
A further important diﬀerence with respect to our setting is that neither of
these papers focuses on a work environment.
In contrast, we focus explicitly on a real work environment in our study
1See, among others, Wilson [1987], Case and Katz [1991], Crane [1991], Glaeser et
al. [1996], Topa [1997], Encinosa et al. [1998], Aaronson [1998], Van Den Berg [1998],
Bertrand et al. [2000], Ichino and Maggi [2000], Katz, Kling and Liebman [2001] and
Sacerdote [2001]. See also the literature based on the classic Hawthorne experiments (e.g.,
Whitehead [1938] and more recently Jones [1990]).
3and we aim to assess the existence of peer eﬀects in a fully controlled setting
where no possible confounding factor can hinder this assessment. As in any
other controlled experiment, the possibility of obtaining clean evidence com-
plements the evidence generated by observational studies in an informative
way.2
Our subjects were recruited randomly and asked to perform a typical
short term job, which was paid independently of individual or team output.
The work task was to stuﬀ letters into envelopes. We study two treatments.
In the ‘pair’ treatment, which is our main treatment, two subjects work
simultaneously in the same room. This setting allows for the possibility that
the behavior of a subject is aﬀected by the behavior of the other member
of the pair. Given two subjects i and j in a pair, we speak of positive peer
eﬀects if the output of i systematically raises the output of j,a n dv i c ev e r s a ,
leading to similar output levels within the pair. A formal characterization
of this deﬁnition will be given in Section 3. In the second treatment (the
‘single’ treatment), which serves as control, peer eﬀects are ruled out by
design because subjects work alone in a room. Output in this treatment
reveals the level of productivity in the absence of any peer inﬂuence. The
comparison of the outputs arising in the pair treatment with those from the
single treatment permits the assessment of the eﬀects of peers on individual
productivity.
Our main results are the following: First, we ﬁnd strong and unambiguous
evidence for the existence of positive peer eﬀects in the pair treatment. This
can be inferred from the fact that output within pairs is very similar, while
2For related literature on laboratory experiments aimed at measuring peer eﬀects see
Falk and Fischbacher [2002] and Falk, Fischbacher, and G¨ achter [2002]. Nagin et al. [2002]
provide instead an example of controlled experimentation in a real labor setting, although
their focus is on a diﬀerent issue.
4diﬀering substantially between pairs. This diﬀerence is particularly striking
when compared to what happens in random allocations of subjects from the
pair and the single treatment in simulated pairs. By comparing the stan-
dard deviation of output within and between true and simulated pairs, we
show that peer eﬀects are large and highly signiﬁcant. Second, even though
economic incentives are identical, average output in the pair treatment is
higher than that in the single treatment. Thus, peer eﬀects signiﬁcantly in-
crease output. Third, we show that peer inﬂuence aﬀects subjects diﬀerently.
In particular we ﬁnd that it mainly improves the output of less productive
subjects. Finally we derive an implicit estimate for the strength of peer ef-
fects. Interestingly, the estimated coeﬃcient is very similar to a comparable
estimate, which was derived by Maggi and Ichino (2000) with observational
data.
Our results raise important questions for the eﬃcient design of the work-
place. For example, in order to maximize work output it may be better to
have people working in groups rather than alone. Moreover, grouping low
and high productivity workers together instead of forming groups of workers
with similar productivity may increase output.
In the next Section we present the design of our experiment. Section 3
discusses the behavioral hypotheses. Section 4 contains our results. Section
5 concludes.
2 Design of the ﬁeld experiment
The goal of this paper is to study potential peer eﬀects on work behavior.
We therefore conducted a ﬁeld experiment where subjects who performed
a simple task in a highly controlled environment were exogenously sorted
into two diﬀerent treatments. Before discussing our treatments in detail, we
5describe the recruitment process, the work task and the procedures.
2.1 Recruitment
All our subjects were high-school students who were recruited from diﬀerent
schools in the area of Winterthur, a city in the canton of Zurich (Switzerland).
Students were asked in announcements posted on blackboards whether they
wanted to do a simple short term job requiring no previous knowledge. In
the announcement it was stated that the job was a one-time four hour job,
which was paid 90 Swiss Francs (1 Swiss Franc ≈ .70 US or ≈ .70 EURO).
The payment was obviously attractive as we were able to recruit the number
of subjects we had planned to recruit within 24 hours.
Students applied by email. After receiving their applications, we informed
them of the precise date and location where they were expected for the job.
The experiment took place during the 2002 spring vacations, which cover two
weeks. It was performed in a high-school building in Winterthur.
2.2 Procedure and task
Upon arrival, subjects were welcomed and informed about the task and the
procedural details. In particular, they were told that they had to work for
four hours without a break and that at the end of this time, they would
receive their payment.
We chose a work task, which is simple, requires no previous knowledge
and is easy to measure. In particular, students had to prepare the mailing of
a questionnaire study for the University of Zurich. This job basically involved
stuﬃng letters into envelopes. First, subjects had to fold two sheets of paper
(one sheet contained the description of the questionnaire, the other was to
be ﬁlled out by the recipients of the study). After placing the two sheets
6into the envelope, subjects had to seal the envelope and to put an A-priority
sticker on it. When a set of 25 envelopes had been completed the set had to
be bundled with a rubber band and put in a box. The work environment was
exactly the same for each subject, including, e.g., the same type of desk and
chair and the same large number of envelopes and sheets (Figure 1 displays
a picture of a subject’s desk). Payment was independent of output and paid
in cash. In both treatments the procedure was exactly the same.
2.3 Treatments
We study two treatments, the “pair” and the “single” treatment. In the pair
treatment two subjects did the task described above at the same time in the
same room. The two desks were situated in such a way that a subject could
easily realize the output of the other subject (the position of the second
desk can be seen in the background of Figure 1). Subjects were free to
communicate but instructed that they had to perform the task described
above independently. Hence, they were not allowed to engage in teamwork
or division of labor. We invited only students from diﬀerent high-schools to
participate in this treatment in order to minimize the possibility that two
subjects in the pair treatment knew each other.
In the pair treatment peer eﬀects were possible. In contrast, peer eﬀects
were ruled out by design in the single treatment. In this control treatment
everything was exactly the same as in the pair treatment except that in
this case each subject worked alone in a room. Since subjects did not have
any contact to another subject and were not informed about other subjects’
output in this treatment, the single treatment rules out any potential peer
eﬀect stemming from a co-worker. Therefore, a comparison of output arising
in the single treatment with that of the pair treatment, indicates the potential
7eﬀects of peers on productivity.
A total of 24 subjects participated in our study, eight in the single treat-
ment and 16 (eight pairs) in the pair treatment. The subjects were randomly
allocated to the treatments. No subject participated in more than one treat-
ment.
From a methodological point of view some aspects about the design are
worth pointing out: Unlike most lab experiments that study work behavior,
our subjects performed a ‘real’ task. In a typical lab experiment the choice
of work eﬀort is represented by an increasing monetary function, i.e., instead
of choosing real eﬀort subjects choose a costly number. This procedure has
been used in tournament experiments, e.g., Bull, Schotter and Weigelt [1987],
or in eﬃciency wage experiments, e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl [1993].
Some authors have recently conducted so-called ‘real eﬀort’ experiments to
study incentive mechanisms and eﬃciency wages. In Fahr and Irlenbusch
[2000] subjects had to crack walnuts, in van Dijk et al. [2001] subjects
performed cognitively demanding tasks on the computer (two-variable op-
timization problems) and in Gneezy [2003] subjects had to solve mazes at
the computer. However, the task is not perceived as economically valuable
at least in the latter two studies, meaning that an important dimension of
work which is usually performed is missing. In contrast, subjects performed
a regular and economically valuable job in our study.
3B e h a v i o r a l h y p o t h e s e s
To illustrate in a simple way what we would expect to happen in the pair
treatment if peer eﬀects existed, we assume that the output Xi of subject i
in a pair is given by
Xi = βXj + θi (1)
8where Xj is the output of the other subject j, θi denotes the (random) innate
productivity of i and β measures how the output of i depends on the output
of j when they work in a pair. Within this context we say that peer eﬀects
exist and are positive if the output of i increases with the output of j,w h i c h
formally means:
Deﬁnition 1 If β>0, positive peer eﬀects exist in a pair. β =0implies
absence of peer eﬀects, while these eﬀects are negative if β<0.
This speciﬁcation is intentionally rather simple because our goal is not
the examination of the determinants of peer eﬀects, but the description of
what we should see in the data generated by our experiment if peer eﬀects
exist, using a parsimonious set of assumptions.3








while the same subject in the single treatment would produce
X
s
i = θi (3)
since in this treatment no other subject exercises any pressure on i.S y m -
metrically, we can derive analogous expressions for j. It is important to note
that random assignment ensures that types θ are randomly distributed in
the two treatments.
Points P and S in Figure 2 describe the respective equilibria of the pair
and single treatments. The ﬁgure also plots the reaction curves described by
3For a discussions of possible determinants of peer eﬀects leading to equations like (1)
see, among others, Kandel and Lazear [1992], Akerlof [1997] Spagnolo [1999] and Huck,
K¨ ubler and Weibull [2002].
9equation (1) for the pair treatment, which cross at P, and by equation (3)
for the single treatment, which cross at S.
It is immediately obvious that the diﬀerence between the output levels of












As a result, positive peer eﬀects can be detected in the pair treatment ac-
cording to the following proposition, which will be tested in Section 4.
Proposition 1 If positive peer eﬀects exist, i.e., β>0, the absolute value
of the diﬀerence between output levels within pairs should be smaller than if
there were no peer eﬀects.
An illustration of Proposition 1 is given with the help of Figure 2, where
P shows an equilibrium with β>0a n dS shows an equilibrium with β =0 .
Since P is closer to the 45-degree line than S, output levels are more similar
in P in comparison to S. Moreover, it is obvious that a higher β implies
output levels which are increasingly similar in the P equilibrium.
The setting of our experiment oﬀers the possibility for testing further
implications of peer eﬀects. In the absence of these eﬀects, the distributions
of output should be the same in the pair and in the single treatment. This
is so because the economic incentives are identical in both conditions. Each
subject receives 90 Swiss Francs for four hours of work independent of output.
Of course, there might be individual diﬀerences because some subjects are,
e.g., more talented than others or feel more obliged to perform well than
others do. Since subjects are randomly allocated to the treatment conditions,
however, individual diﬀerences should cancel out.
On the contrary, if peer eﬀects do exist, it is easy to show that the average
output in the two treatments should diﬀer. Using equation (1), the average




















A comparison of equations (5) and (6) shows that, in the presence of positive
peer eﬀects such that 0 <β<1, average output is higher in the pair treat-
ment than in the single treatment. This can also be inferred from Figure 2
where output in the P equilibrium is clearly higher compared to output in
the S equilibrium. If instead β>1 the output level of the two subjects would
still be higher in the pair treatment but it would be equal to inﬁnity. On
the contrary, in the case of negative eﬀects (β<0) the output of a subject
reduces the output of the other, in which case the output of the pair treat-
ment would be lower than the output of the single treatment. Our model
therefore suggests a second proposition, which will be tested in Section 4.
Proposition 2 In the presence of positive peer eﬀects, the average output of
the pair treatment exceeds that of the single treatment.
Note that Proposition 2 states a behavioral consequence of peer eﬀects,
which is similar to the so-called ‘social facilitation’ paradigm in social psy-
chology. According to this paradigm even the mere presence of another per-
son improves one’s performance. Numerous studies have supported evidence
for this type of behavior.4
4See for example Zajonc [1965], Cottrell et al. [1968] and Hunt and Hillery [1973]. In
Allport [1920], performance of subjects doing simple tasks (like chain word association)
was much better in groups than if subjects did the tasks alone. In a more recent study,
Towler [1986] takes the time cars need to reach a 100-yards mark from a standing start
at traﬃc lights. He reports that the if there are two cars at the traﬃc light the time to
travel the 100 yards is signiﬁcantly shorter than if there is just one car.
11Our ﬁnal proposition deals with the relationship between peer eﬀects and
individual innate productivity. We have shown above that peer eﬀects lead
to a higher output in the pair treatment compared to the single treatment.
We now ask how this increase depends on a subject’s innate productivity θ.
Assume that i is the more productive subject of a pair, i.e., θi >θ j.T h i sa l s o
implies that i would produce more in the single treatment than j.C o n s i d e r
further the diﬀerence ∆Xi = XP
i − XS
i between the two potential output
levels for subject i in the pair and in the single treatment and, symmetrically
for j,c o n s i d e ra l s o∆ Xj = XP
j − XS
j .U s i n g2a n d3i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t
∆Xj > ∆Xi if 0 <β<1( 7 )
Equation (7) implies that if a ﬁnite equilibrium exists, the following propo-




j in Figure 2):
Proposition 3 Positive peer eﬀects may lead to an individual output in-
crease, which is inversely related to the individual’s innate productivity θ.
Hence, our simple model suggests three propositions, which describe the
implications of peer eﬀects in our treatments. We test these propositions in
the next section where we also show how our data can be used, in the light
of the model described above, to derive an implicit estimate of β.
4R e s u l t s
In this section we present our results and test our behavioral predictions.
Our main interest concerns the existence of positive peer eﬀects, which are
revealed by the observation that output levels within pairs are similar in the
pair treatment. In order to test Proposition 1, consider the standard devi-
12ation of output within and between pairs.5 In the absence of peer eﬀects
(i.e., β = 0), working in a particular pair has no eﬀect on individual behav-
ior. In this case, therefore, the standard deviations of output within pairs
should be identical to those generated by any simulated conﬁguration of pairs
constructed from the same group of people. Moreover, there should be no
reason to expect that the between and within standard deviations obtained
with the true pairs should diﬀer in any speciﬁc direction. Therefore, we can
construct a test for the endogenous formation of peer eﬀects by comparing
the standard deviations generated by the true pairs of our experiment with
those generated by a random set of simulated conﬁgurations of pairs. This
comparison is shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5.
The ﬁrst of these ﬁgures plots the kernel density of the simulated within
pairs standard deviations computed for 20,271 randomly chosen diﬀerent
conﬁgurations of pairs of the 16 individuals involved in the pair treatment.
To be more precise, we generated all 2,027,025 possible conﬁgurations of
8 pairs with these 16 individuals6 and for one out of every 100 of these
conﬁgurations we computed the within pairs standard deviation.7
The variation of these simulated within standard deviations ranges from
9.6 to 34.8 letters. The vertical line in Figure 3 identiﬁes the standard devia-
tion within true pairs, i.e., that computed for the pairs who actually worked
5We use standard deviations instead of diﬀerences to facilitate the computation and the
comparison of within and between statistics. This, however, does not change the substance
of our results because, in our speciﬁc case, the standard deviation within a pair is equal
to the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the output levels of the pair divided by the
square root of 2.
6 This number of conﬁgurations is in general equal to
(N−2)/2
i=0 (N − 2i − 1), where N
is the (even) number of individuals, i.e. 16 in our case.
7We would have liked computing the within pairs standard deviations for all the
2,027,025 conﬁgurations but this calculation would have required a substantial amount
of computer time without any major gain from the viewpoint of the reliability of our
results.
13together in our experiment. This standard deviation is equal to 14.6 let-
ters and only 1.17% of the simulated conﬁgurations originated a lower value.
This evidence suggests that on average the output levels of two individuals
working in the same room on separate tasks, are signiﬁcantly more similar
than the output levels of two individuals working separately. In other words,
in the absence of any peer eﬀect, the probability of observing a within-pairs
deviation as low as 14.6 is on average less than 1.17%.8 Hence, we can reject
the hypothesis of the absence of peer eﬀects with a high level of conﬁdence.
In line with Figure 3, we ﬁnd in Figure 4, that the observed standard
deviation between the true pairs in the experiment (which is equal to 33.7
letters) is higher than 98.85% of the between standard deviations generated
by the simulated conﬁgurations of pairs. The chance that such a high between
standard deviation could be generated in the absence of peer eﬀects is ex-
tremely low (in particular smaller than 1.15%). Moreover, Figure 5 plots the
kernel density of the between minus within diﬀerence for each hypothetical
conﬁguration of pairs. It is evident that this diﬀerence is not systematically
positive or negative since it is approximately symmetric around zero. Note
that this is exactly what one would expect in the absence of peer eﬀects,
while in the presence of these eﬀects, the between standard deviation should
be larger than the within. This is indeed what we ﬁnd for the true pairs of
our experiment: the between minus within diﬀerence is equal to 19.0 letters,
as indicated by the vertical line in the ﬁgure. For only less than 1.17% of
the simulated conﬁgurations the analogous diﬀerence reaches a higher value.
Hence, while in the absence of peer eﬀects there would be no reason to ex-
8Note that the standard deviations computed for the simulated conﬁgurations are iden-
tically but not independently distributed random variables. Because of stochastic varia-
tion, the true probability of observing a within standard deviation smaller than 14.6 in a
simulated conﬁguration might be larger or smaller than 1.17%. However, it will be equal
to this value on average, since the random variables are identically distributed.
14pect the within standard deviation to be smaller than the between standard
deviation or vice versa, Figure 5 suggests that when individuals are paired
in the same room the between pairs deviation is signiﬁcantly larger than the
within pairs deviation. This implies that, ceteris paribus, working in pairs
induces more similar output levels than working separately.
As a further test of Proposition 1, we compare data from the single and
the pair treatment. In the single treatment subjects worked independently
without being inﬂuenced by any co-worker. If peer eﬀects exist we should
therefore ﬁnd that the standard deviations of output within pairs in the pair
treatment are smaller than the corresponding standard deviations of all the
conﬁguration of simulated pairs of subjects which can be formed in the single
treatment. Given our data there are 105 possible conﬁgurations of 4 pairs
with 8 individuals (see footnote 6). Only one of these 105 conﬁgurations
originates a hypothetical within standard deviation lower than that obtained
with the true pairs of the pair treatment. The likelihood that this ﬁnding is
just pure coincidence in the absence of peer eﬀects is below 1 percent. The
data from the single treatment therefore conﬁrms our previous results.
We now turn to our second proposition. Remember that according to
standard economic theory average output levels in the pair and the single
treatment should be similar because incentives are identical in both treat-
ments. In the presence of peer eﬀects, however, output should be higher in
the pair compared to the single treatment. This is in fact what we ﬁnd. The
average output in the single treatment is 190 envelopes while average output
in the pair treatment is 221 envelopes. The diﬀerence is not only sizeable in
percentage terms (16.3 percent) but also statistically signiﬁcant despite the
small sample size. To show this we regress outputs in both treatments on
a treatment dummy for the pair treatment. The respective p-value of this
15dummy is 0.068. This is conﬁrmed by the non parametric Wilcoxon ranksum
test (p =0 .049, one sided). Thus peer eﬀects lead to higher average output
as hypothesized in Proposition 2.
We now turn to a test of our third proposition suggesting that subjects
with a lower innate productivity should be more aﬀected by the inﬂuence of
peers than those with a higher innate productivity. Formally, this means that
if we could observe the diﬀerence XP
i − XS
i between the two counterfactual
output levels of a subject i in the pair and in the single treatment, this
diﬀerence should decrease in the innate productivity θi.
With the data at our disposal we cannot perform this direct test of Propo-
sition 3. An approximation is to use the quantiles of the output distributions
for the single and the pair treatments to approximate the counterfactual out-
put levels in the two treatments of subjects with a given innate productivity.
The idea is that the productivity θP
q corresponding to quantile q of the out-
put distribution in the pair treatment should be equal to the productivity
θS
q of the same quantile in the output distribution of the single treatment.
Given equation (1) this is exactly true if all subjects in the pair treatment
were hypothetically matched with the same individual j. However, it is true
only as an approximation given that our subjects are not matched with the
same partner in the pair treatment. The fact that they are matched ran-
domly, however, allows us to approximate the ideal test described above by
measuring how the diﬀerence XP
q − XS
q changes with XS
q = θq for diﬀerent
quantiles q of the two output distributions.
These quantiles are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1. For example the
output of the 10th quantile in the single treatment is 133 while it is 175 in the
pair treatment. By taking the diﬀerence between the quantile outputs we can
asses the average increase in output of subjects with a similar productivity.
16If these diﬀerences decline as we move from the 10th to the 90th quantile,
we have evidence in favor of Proposition 3. Column 3 in Table 1 shows
that this diﬀerence in fact declines. The Spearman rank correlation between
these diﬀerences and the corresponding productivity levels is negative and
highly signiﬁcant (Spearman’s rho = -0.900, p= 0.018 (one sided))9.T h u si n
accordance with Proposition 3, the evidence suggests that low productivity
workers are more sensitive to the behavior of peers than are high productivity
workers.
We conclude this section by showing how, in the light of our simple model
of Section 3, the data generated by our experiment can be used to estimate β.
Remember that this parameter measures how the output of i inﬂuences the
output of j in a pair and vice versa. Equations (2) and (3) say that a subject






i = θi, respectively. Substituting the sample averages ¯ Xp for X
p
i and
¯ Xs for θi and θj, we can compute the average β solving ¯ Xp =




1−β2 . This gives an implicit estimate of β =0 .14, which implies
that when the output of j increases by one unit, the output of i increases by
0.14 units on average. Of course, we do not claim that 0.14 is a universal
number. Yet, it is interesting and reassuring to see that Maggi and Ichino
(2000), who derive a comparable estimate of β with observational data, get
very similar numbers. Depending on the used controls and speciﬁcations
their estimates are β =0 .14, β =0 .18 and β =0 .15.
9In addition it is interesting to note that the bootstrapped p-values (of the test that the
corresponding quantiles are equal) increase in the quantile level. The p-values for the 10th,
25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles are 0.048, 0.145, 0.388, 0.432 and 0.788, respectively.
These p-values are interesting for two reasons. First they show that only the diﬀerence
for the lowest quantile is signiﬁcant. Second the probability that the respective quantiles
from the single and the pair treatment are the same appears to increase monotonically
going from lower to higher quantiles of the output distribution.
175 Summary
In this paper we have presented clear and unambiguous evidence in favor of
the existence of peer eﬀects. We show in a controlled ﬁeld experiment that
the behavior of subjects working in pairs is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the
behavior of subjects working alone. The standard deviations within pairs
are signiﬁcantly smaller than between pairs. As a second result, peer eﬀects
work in the direction of raising the overall average productivity signiﬁcantly.
We also show that the less productive workers react more signiﬁcantly
to peer eﬀects than do high productivity workers. In other words, “bad
apples”, far from damaging “good apples”, seem instead to gain in quality
when paired with these latter. This raises the interesting question of how
to allocate low and high productivity workers optimally. In the light of our
results, the output maximizing strategy might be to group low and high
productivity workers instead of grouping workers of similar productivity.
Note that in our study the presence of peer eﬀects is robust and quan-
titatively important even though subjects interacted only once and did not
know each other. This suggests the possibility that the eﬀects measured in
our study are a lower boundary for the eﬀects that prevail in actual labor
relations.
In contrast with this conclusion, however, it can also be argued that a
setting of repeated interactions over a longer horizon might generate eﬀects,
which cannot be easily predicted on the basis of our evidence. For example,
while in the short run the least productive workers seem to react to the
higher productivity of their peers, in the long run the opposite might be
true if it becomes clear that, as in our setting, low levels of output have no
consequences on rewards. To shed light on these issues, the next step in
18our research agenda is to collect evidence on peer eﬀects when interaction
between peers is repeated over longer horizons.
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Quantile single pair diﬀerence
treatment treatment
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Note: columns 1 and 2 of the table report the quantiles of the output distribution
for the single and the pair treatments, estimated using a quantile regression of
output on a dummy for the pair treatment plus a constant. Column 3 reports
the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the quantiles estimated for the two
treatments.
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Fig. 3: St. dev. within true and hypothetical pairs in pair sample
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Fig. 4: St. dev. between true and hypothetical pairs in pair sample
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Fig. 5: Between - within st. dev. for true and hypothetical pairs
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